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LEGAL DUTIES AND RIGHTS.
Every student and practitioner of our law will doubtless assent
to the statement that it is extremely desirable that the amorphous
bulk of which it now consists, which is becoming continually more
and more unmanageable as each year's contribution of reports and
text-books is poured out, should be reduced to a logical and scientific
arrangement. Whether that should be embodied in a code is a
question on which opinions differ, and which need not be discussed
here. A code is not necessary. What is needed is some arrange-
ment which shall be generally accepted by the bench and the bar
and followed by legislators and the writers of treatises and digests.
It might be prepared and put forth without a code by such a body
as the Inns of Court in England, or the American Bar Association
in the United States. In that case it could be fully discussed,
tested in practice and modified, if necessary, before being authori-
tatively promulgated in a statute. Indeed, considering how import-
ant it would be that the arrangement once adopted in a code should
be a final one and how largely the systematic study of the law
has been negi. cted among us, it might be very plausibly argued
that no body of codifiers at present would be likely to strike out
a satisfactory arrangement, and that it would be better that the
arrangement to be followed should be known and generally
accepted before the work of codification was begun.
Such an arrangement must rest on an exhaustive analysis of
legal conceptions, the results of which must be expressed in a
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systematized terminology. The purpose of this article i to make
a small contribution towards a scheme of arrangement by analysing
the fundamental legal notions of duty, right and wrong.
A legal duty is the legal condition of a person whom the law
commands or forbids to do an act. The act may be called the
content of the duty; it is what must be described in defining anyparticular duty. The act itself is a fact, which might exist if there
were no law and no duty. The law does not create it, but merely
recognizes its actual or possible existence. The duty is a legal
condition, the mere creature of the law. The acts which form
the contents of legal duties are defined by reference to some of
their actual or possible consequences. An act per se, a mere bodily
movement, is never either commanded or forbidden by the law.There is no conceivable bodily movement which a person in some
circumstances might not lawfully do or omit. The movements of
the arm and hand which take place in firing a pistol might beperformed exactly by a person who had nothing in his hand, and
would generally in such a case be lawful, because no harmful con-
sequence could be apprehended from them. If he held an unloaded
pistol, no physical injury could follow to any p&rson at whom thepistol was aimed, and so far as the act misrht be prohibited with
reference to such consequences, the prohibition would not apply.
But if the latter person believed the' weapon to be loaded, the act
might create in him an apprehension of injury, and that psychical
consequence might suffice to make the act unlawful as amounting
to an assault.
The consequences by reference to which the act is defined, which
may be called its definitional consequences and also the definitional
consequences of the duty, are either actual, probable or intended
consequences. This gives rise to a three-fold division of duties,
as follows. i. Peremptory duties: the definitional consequences
are actual. The person must or must not act in such a way as
actually to produce a certain consequence. The law does not specify
the acts any farther than to point out the result which must be
attained. But the requirement to attain that result is usually per-
emptory; it is not enough that the person subject to the duty has
done all in his power to attain it and has failed by no fault of his
own. The duty to pay a debt is of this sort. The debtor mustperemptorily do such acts as are necessary to put the creditor into
the possession of the money. He may choose his own means, but
chooses them at his peril. The duty of a person Who voluntarily
keeps a dog known to him to be ferocious and inclined to bite
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mankind to prevent it from doing so, is of this class. He is not
merely bound to keep it carefully, or even with extreme care; he
must absolutely prevent that result. In a few cases where the
act is defined by actual consequences and the duty is negative, not
to cause a certain result, it may be that the duty is not strictly
peremptory, but is conditioned on intention or negligence. Duties
not to commit trespasses are duties defined by actual consequences,
but it is still a mooted point whether intention or negligence is
necessary to a trespass.
2. Duties of reasonableness: the act is defined by reference to
its probable consequences. The person must not do any act that
is unreasonably likely to cause a certain consequence or must do
such acts as are reasonably necessary to prevent its happening. If
he does so much as this, he has done his whole duty and is not
responsible for what actually happens; if he acts so as to incur
an unreasonably great risk of the consequence happening, he has
broken his duty, though in fact by good luck it never actually
does happen. Thus a person who drives in a crowded street
necessarily takes some risk of running over some one. As his
speed increases that risk increases likewise. At last a point may
be reached at which the risk becomes unreasonably great, and his
conduct in driving so fast a breach of duty, even though he dues
not actually run over any one. So a bailee must not so act or
omit to act as to expose the chattel to an unreasonably great risk
of loss or injury, what is unreasonable varying according to the
circumstances of the case, especially the value of the thing and the
nature of the bailment. If the chattel is lost or injured without
such conduct on his part, he is not guilty of any breach of duty;
the duty is not peremptory to keep it safe. All duties to use due
care belong to this class. Negligence, which is the opposite of due
care, consists essentially in conduct which involves an unreasonably
great risk of causing harm.
3. Duties of intention: the act is defined by reference to ius
intended consequences. The person must not act with an intention
to produce a certain consequence. Making a false representation
to another person with an intent to defraud him by leading him
to act upon it to his iniury is a breach of this sort of duty, and so
are all injuries in which malice-that is, actual malice or malice in
fact-is an ingredient, all the meanings of actual malice having
the common element of an intention to produce some consequence.
There is no general rule for determining what legal dutie i.-,xist.
what acts are commanded or forbidden by law. Much labor an(
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ingenuity have been expended in the attempt to find some general
criterion of legal right and wrong, some general basis of legal
liability. But in vain; there is none. Various acts are commanded
or forbidden for various reasons, generally on grounds of ex-
pediency; and they are different in different places and periods. In
this respect the law presents itself as having a purely arbitrary or
positive character, and the duties that exist in any particular system
of law must simply be separately learned.
Duties in some cases are owed to particular persons. What is
meant by a duty being owed to a person, and how it is known
who that person is, will be explained further on.
Rights are of four classes. As these have no recognized names,
they may be here designated for convenience sake by the names
of correspondent, permissive, protected and facultative rights.
i. Correspondent rights. When one person owes a duty to
another to do or abstain from an act, the latter person is said to
have a right against the person subject to the duty, to have the act
done or not done. If A ought not to beat B, B has a right agains!
A not to be beaten. Such a right is the legal condition of a person
to whom a duty is owed. The same act which forms the content
of the duty stands also as the content of the right. The duty and
the right may be said to correspond .to each other; rather they ate
two names for different aspects of the same thing, i. e., of a certain
legal relation between two parties, which looked at from the stand-.
point of one is a duty owed by him to the other, and from the latter's
standpoint is a right which he has against the former. Hence
neither can be enferred from the other, because the conclusion i.-
already contained in the premise, or is identical with it. To argue.
a creditor has a right to his money, therefore the debtor ought to
pay, is invalid as involving a petitio principii, if a correspondew
right is meant.
A right of this sort can not be exercised, but can be violated.
To exercise a right means to do, or abstain from, the act which
forms its content. But here ex hypothesi the only act is one that is
to be done, if at all, not by the holder of the right but by the other
party on whom the duty rests. There may be some way to enforce
the right by compelling that other party to do what he ought to do
or to make compensation for not doing so; but enforcement is
different from exercise. The violation of a right on the other hand
is effected by the conduct of the other party, and is therefore pos-
sible of such rights. Moreover a breach of the corresponding duty
involves necessarily, or rather is the same thing as, the violation
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of the right; the two can not be separated in fact or distinguished
in thought.
These rights are of no legal importance as distinct from their
corresponding duties. When the duty has been described, enough
will have been said about the right; it will not require a separate
treatment for any legal purpose. Certain writers of eminence, how-
ever, have regarded correspondent rights as the only kind of rights,
and have endeavored to set forth arrangements of the law based on
that conception. It is submitted that they are in error, for reasons
that will appear in the course of the following discussion.
2. Permissive rights. A person is said to have a right to do
or abstain from an act when the law does not forbid or command
him to do it. A permissive right is the legal condition of a person
who is not subject to a duty. Free speech, religious freedom, the
freedom of the press, the right of use which the owner of a thing
has in it, many of our most important rights and liberties, belong
to this class of rights. The content of this kind of a right, like
that of the preceding kind, is an act. But, and herein these rights
differ from the preceding ones, the act is one to be done by the
holder of the right himself and not by the person subject to a
corresponding duty. Indeed, there is no such person and no such
duty; the conception of right here is a purely negative one, there
is no special relation to any particular duty. Therefore these rights
can be exercised, but can not be violated. It is true, the holder of
the right may be prevented in various ways from doing the acts
which he has a right to do. But when such prevention is a violation
of right at all, it is because it is effected by interferences with his
person or belongings which amount to violations of a different class
of rights. If it can be effected without such interference, it is not
a violation of right. Thus it is generally not legally wrongful, not
a violation of any legal right, to prevent a person from saying
something which he wishes to say, from exercising his right of
free speech, by threatei-ing to give him a thrashing next week.
But it would be to stop him by actually beating him on the spot,
because therelv his right of bodily security would be violated:
which is a very different right from that of free speech and is not a
mere permissix, ri.-1t. But the one mode of prevenition, so far as
freedom of speech .,;es, might be as effectual as the other, and
would equally be a violation of the right of free speech, if that
right could be violated. The provisions for securing freedom of
speech and similar permissive rights which are contained in the
Constitution of the United States and of the States of the Union.
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which are often spoken of as intended to prevent the violation of
those rights, are really intended to prevent those rights from being
destroyed or taken away by the legislature, to insure ttheir con-
tinuing to exist as legal rights. In the absence of such inhibitions
these, like all other legal rights, could be abolished by statute. But
the abolition, destruction or deprivation of a right is a very dif-
ferent thing from its violation; indeed, is inconsistent with it,
for the right must exist to be violated.
A permissive right may be a right in or over a specific thing, or
in or over a person who for that purpose stands in a position
analogous to that of a thing, as a child whom its father has a
right to chastise. In such a case the content of the right is not a
class of acts generally, but the acts so far as their consequences
affect the thing. The definitional consequence of the act are its
effects upon that thing only. The holder of the right is permitted
to do or abstain from the act so far as his doing so will affect the
thing. Beyond that his right does not justify his acts, except in
a few special cases which there is not time to stop and explain
here. This is'the meaning of the maxim, sic utere tuo ut alienum
non laedas. A man may exercise his right of free speech, in a case
that falls within its scope, without any regard to how much mis-
chief he may do thereby or to whom, because that right of his is
general and is not a right in any specific thing. But if he discharges
a gun and hits his neighbor, he can n6t protect himself by the plea
that that was an exercise of his right of use in the gun. It was,
so far as the effect upon the gun went; had the gun been burst in
the firing no one could have complained. But so far as the effect
of his act upon his neighbor's body was concerned, his right of use
of the gun had no relation at all to that; he had no right to fire the
gun so far as it proauced that sort of a consequence. He may have
had a right to shoot his neighbor on some other ground, e. g. that
of self-defense, but that would not be a part of his property right
in the gun. So if a man turns his vicious bull loose in the street,
his conduct is wrongful, not because his right of use in the animal
does not extend to that disposition of him, but because of the
probability of injurious consequences to persons or things other
than the bull; the definitional conseqguences of the acts which form
the content of his permissive rights of property in the bull do not
include such consequences.
It may appear at first sight that the remark made above about
correspondent rights, that they are of no legal importance in dis-
tinction from duties, applies also to permissive rights. This is
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true in general as to those rights which do not have specific subjects,
The right of free speech is sufficiently apparent from the absence of
rules restricting it, and the right of every man to dress as he
pleases from the absence of sumptuary laws. But the case is dif-
ferent with specific permissive rights such as permissive rights of
property. A tenant for life, the holder of an easement or a bailee,
for instance, may deal in certain ways with the thing which is the
subject of his right, but not in all ways. An absolute owner may
do what lie pleases with it. These permissions might, it is true,
be set forth as exceptions to the various duties which forbid men
to meddle with things. We might define the duties by reference
to definitional consequences which consisted in certain effects pro-
duced upon things, and then declare exceptions to those duties in
cases where the actor had come into those relations with the thing
which we call having property rights in it. But the same exceptions
of this sort would apply to all duties, and, for reasons which want
of space forbids to explain fully here, but some of which will readily
occur to the reader, it is more convenient to state them once for all
in the form of permissive rights. Here we meet for the first time
a principle that will come out more prominently in the discussion
of protected rights, that definitions of rights are merely portions
of definitions of duties separated from the rest and stated apart
for reasons of convenience. The sole object of law is to regulate
conduct. A system of law is a description of what acts
nmust or must not be done. Whenever the law appears
to be doing anything else, that is merely in some way ancillary to
its main purpose. The direct description of conduct commanded
or forbidden is the definition of a duty. Duties therefore are the
primary legal entities. But as the descriptions of various different
duties make use of the same conceptions as elements, it is a matter
of obvious convenience to describe these once for all in some part
of the system, and then to use them as praecognos cenda in the
direct definition of duties. That is the part that rights play in law
-at least as to form; as to substance, it may be that rights rather
than duties are the things of real and priniary importance.
The acts that form the contents of permissive rights are always
described by reference to their' actual consequences. There is
nothing in the doctrine of permissive rights corresponding to the
threefold division of duties above mentioned. Therefore if a per-
son's act is done in the exercise of a right, his state of mind is
unil portant. Generally speaking, a pierson is legally justified in
exercising his rights out of pure inlriice, not for the pIrpose of
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benefiting himself but merely to do harm to another. Some courts
in the United States have admitted certain exceptions to this princi-
ple, but they are distinctly exceptions to a general rule and are not
recognized everywhere.
Nevertheless, permissive rights are sometimes limited by reason-
ableness, though not in the same manner as duties. When two
persons have rights in the same thing, one may be paramount to the
other. If it is absolutely paramount, it may be exercised to its
full extent without any regard to how its effect upon the thing
interferes with the exercise of the subordinate right, or even to
whether it makes any exercise of the latter impossible. An ease-
ment is usually thus absolutely paramount to the right of the owner
of the soil. And the easement may be of such a nature as practi-
cally to prevent the owner from getting any benefit from the land;
but this does not prevent the exercise of the easement to its full
extent. Or one right may be reasonably paramount, so far that it
can be exercised to a reasonable extent, however injurious to the
subordinate right, but not paramount to every extent. Thus the
right of navigation in navigable waters is paramount to the right
of fishing, and a vessel may, if reasonably necessary, hold her course
and run over nets; but this should not be done unnecessarily and
wantonly. In other cases the two. rights are equal, and each
permits a reasonable use of the thing with reasonable regard to
the equal rights of the other party, but permits no more than that.
Rights to use a public highway for passage are of this sort. It
thus appears that a permissive right may be a right as to act or
to produce certain results absolutely or only to a reasonable extent.
The case of the use of a highway illustrates very well the difference
between reasonableness in relation to permissive rights and to
duties. If a person stands a loaded wagon in a narrow street and
thus obstructs the way so that others who wish to can not pass,
those consequences of his conduct are actual, not merely probable,
and the question will be whether in actually causing such a stoppage
he has exceeded his right to a reasonable use of the street. But
no right other than his right to use the street is involv.ed. If,
however, he drives fast and thus incurs a risk of running over
some one, the question will be whether the probability of that result
is unreasonably great so as to make his act amount to a breach of
his duty to use due care in driving, a duty which corresponds not
only to the rights of others in the street, but to their rights of
personal security. Of course in many cases an act may be un-
reasonable in both ways: it may produce actual consequences which
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the actor has no right to produce because they amount to an
unreasonable appropriation of the road to the exclusion of others,
and it may at the same time be a breach of some duty because it
is unreasonably likely to cause injury, not necessarily to the road
itself, but to persons or things in the road.
It is true of permissive rights as of duties that there is no
general rule for determining what rights exist. Indeed this fol-
lows from the principle as to duties. The law confers upon men
such rights as are deemed expedient.
3. Protected rights. The consequences of acts are states of
fact, or more exactly substitutions of one state of fact for another.
If A strikes B and wounds him, the former good condition of B's
body, which was a state of fact, is destroyed and a worse state of
fact, a state of mutilation and pain, substituted for it. So in slander
the fact of an existing good reputation is replaced by that of an
impaired one. When a debt is paid, the fact of the creditor's
possession of the money comes into existence. Not only are acts
which are commanded or forbidden defined, as has been said, by
reference to their consequences, but they are commanded or for-
bidden wholly for the sake of the states of fact that form their
consequences. It is these alone, not the acts, that are per se im-
portant; acts have a relative and derivative importance only. While
the direct object of law is to regulate conduct, its ultimate and
real object is to protect states of fact; its regulation of conduct
is to that end only. This protection is of two sorts; sometimes
the law seeks to cause a certain state of fact to come into existence,
as when it commands the performance of a contract; and sometimes
it seeks to prevent the destruction of an existing condition of fact,
as when it forbids harmful acts or requires precautions to be
taken against harm.
The same act or omission may impair various kinds of protected
states of fact. For instance, a single negligent act may injure a
man's own person, disable his wife and deprive him of her services,
destroy various chattels of his, and subject him to pecuniary loss.
And the same state of fact may be impaired by various kinds of
acts or omissions. Moreover it is not every state of fact whose
existence is or may be of importance to a person that the law
undertakes to protect, and of those that. it does protect, it gives
more extensive protection to some than to others. The condition
of a person's body while he is alive is protclted to a very large
extent; the condition of being alive formerly received only a partial
protection. in tne days when no civil action lay for causing death.
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A person's mental condition is in the main unprotected; generally
mental suffering from fear, anxiety, humiliation or invasion of
privacy are without legal remedy. Immovable property is pro-
tected more fully from injuries by persons or palpable things than
from the incursion of impalpable things such as smoke, smells,
noises and the like; yet some protection is given against the latter.
It is therefore convenient, at least in many cases, to describe the
different kinds of states of fact which the law protects separately
from the acts by which they may be created, perserved or impaired.
It is true that acts can not be fully described without reference
direct or indirect, explicit or implied, to the states of fact. But if
the facts, which may be complicated, have been previously described
and designated by an appropriate name, the reference in defining
any particular duty may be a general one only. Also it often
happens that the consequences which are directly definitional of a
duty are not the state of fact which is ultimately important, but
some intermediate state of fact which in its turn will or may affect
the ultimate one. For example, a duty not to make a nuisance
may often be defined by reference to the existence or condition
only of the thing which constitutes the nuisance. The existence
of such a thing is what is immediately forbidden; though the ob-
ject of the prohibition is to prevent injuries to persons or. to other
things, whose condition is the ultimately important state of fact.
This separation for purposes of convenience between the act and
the state of fact that is ultimately to be protected by the doing or
omission of the act, gives rise to the conception of another class
of rights, for legal purposes the most important class, having for
their contents the protected states of fact. It makes more clear the
meaning of two statements in the foregoing discussion; namely,
first, that while in form duty was the primary and important con-
ception in law, in substance right rather than duty was such, and
secondly, that a definition of a right was a part of that of a duty
separated from the rest for convenience.
A protected right is the legal condition of a person for whom
the law protects a state of fact by imposing duties upon other
persons whose performance will or will tend to bring the state of
fact into existence or prevent its destruction. The protected state
of fact, not any act, is the content of the right. Therefore a right
of this sort can not be exercised, but can be violated. Any impair-
ment of the state of fact is a violation of the right. In ordinary
usage the word violation is applied only to impairments that are
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caused by wrongful conduct, by breaches of duty, on the part of
others. But it will be convenient to use the word to denote any
impairment however caused. In this sense, however, a violation
of a right does not always amount to a wrong. If A strikes B
with a club and breaks his arm, there is a violation of B's right
of bodily security, the condition of his body, which is the state
of fact that forms the content of that right, is impaired; and this
is due to A's breach of duty and is a wrong. But if A accidentally
stumbles against B and knocks him down with the result of break-
ing his arm, B's right is equally violated; but, since A has done
no wrongful act, no act which is a breach of any duty, he has
committed no wrong.
Protected rights are absolute or relative. In the former, which
are much the more numerous, the right is violated, as above
described, by any impairment of the state of fact which constitutes
its content, without more. But in a relative right the mere
impairment of that state of fact is not by itself sufficient to amount
to a violation of the right. There must follow as its consequence
an impairment of some secondary state of fact to which the right
is said to be relative. Thus the right of personal security is an
absolute right; but the right which a husband has in the security
of his wife is relative to her services. A physical injury to her
is not a violation of his rights unless it causes a loss of services.
Every person has two rights of reputation, an absolute right,
which is violated by the publication about him of a libel or one
of those slanders which are said to be actionable per se, and a
relative right, relative to his pecuniary condition, which is violated
by a slander not actionable per se but which actually causes special
damage, i. e., pecuniary loss.
When the protected state of fact includes the possession or
condition of a thing, the thing is the subject of the right, and the
right is said to be a right in, to or over the thing. A person may
also stand in the situation of a thing as the subject of a right, as a
wife or child.
A duty which is imposed for the protection of a right is said
to correspond to that right and to be owed to the holder of it.
There is no general rule for ascertaining what duties correspond
to any particular right or to what rights any partitular duty
corresponds. This c,.rre iondcnce is determined by positive rules
of law based on various considerations of expediency. Some rights,
such as those of bodily secu rity and property rights in material
things, have many duties corresponding to them, and other rights,
YALE LAW JOURNAL.
such as reputation, have few. Some duties, for instance the duty
not to make a fraudulent misrepresentation, correspond to many
rights, while there are duties, like the duty to take care of dangerous
animals, whose range of correspondence is narrower. This subject
of the correspondence of duties to rights will be taken up again
further on.
When the duty is not defined by reference to the actual conse-
quences of the act, the duty may be broken without any consequences
ensuing and therefore without the violation of any right to which
it corresponds. If a violation of the right actually takes place, it
may be separated by an interval of time from the breach of duty.
Even if the definitional consequences of the duty are actual conse-
quences, still if they are such intermediate facts as have been
above mentioned and not facts which constitute an impairment of
the protected condition of fact, it may still be true that a violation
of the right need never follow or may follow only after an interval
of time. If, for instance, A lays poison for the purpose of killing
B's cattle, there is at once a breach of duty, a completed wrongful
act. But if the cattle never find and eat it, B's rights in them
are never violated, and even if they do so, it.may happen some
time after the commission of the breach of duty. But when the
duty is defined by actual consequences and these are such as are
involved in the content of the protected right, then the duty can
not be broken without the right being at the same time violated,
though the breach of duty and the violation of right can still be
distinguished theoretically for legal purposes. This is the
case in a trespass or the failure to pay a debt, and
indeed, as will hereafter appear, in breaches of contract generally.
4. Facultative rights. A right of this kind is the legal power
or capacity to dispose of some other right which is not vested in
the person having the power. Such a power is sometimes exer-
cisable by the mere act of the party himself, as in the case of a
power of appointment, and sometimes only by the aid of a court,
as in a maritime or equitable lien. A facultative right has no
duties corresponding to it and can not be violated; but it can be
exercised, its content being acts.
Rights are divided into rights in rein and in personam. This
nomenclature is objectionable, because all rights are against persons
and none against things, and rights in rem have no necessary rela-
tion to things; and in a scientific arrangement of the law some
substitute should be found for it. But the terms will be used here
because they are the established ones. Rights in rem are such as
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avail against all the world; rights in personam (certain sie deter-
iniatain, as Austin says) against particular persons only. The
importance of the distinction between these two classes of rights
has been doubted or denied. But it is practically important, at
least as to protected rights, for the following reasons. The con-
tents of protected rights in rein consist of a few states of fact,
all of which can be easily enumerated and described once for all.
Also the duties corresponding to them are different from those
which correspond to rights in personain, and are capable of ex-
haustive enumeration and description. Therefore it is possible,
.and is the method that most conduces to clearness and convenience,
to treat rights in rein and their corresponding duties separately
from each other and to arrange the discussion of them according
to the nature of their contents. This will more clearly appear
from the enumeration of rights in rein presently to be attempted.
On the other hand, the contents of rights in personarn and of
their corresponding duties are very various, being determined in
most cases by the will of the parties to some agreement, the duties
are all so defined that their breach can not be separated from the
violation of the right nor can they be separately described. The
only feasible arrangement of this class of rights and their corre-
sponding duties is not according to their contents, but according to
their various modes of origin, describing the right and the duty in
conjunction. This necessitates a very different mode of treatment
of them from what is appropriate to rights in rein, and therefore
requires their separation from the latter in an arrangement of the law.
In defining a protected right, the direct and theoretically proper
way is to describe the state of fact which forms its content, and
perhaps in a statute or code that way ought in all cases to be fol-
lowed. But it is often practically more convenient to describe it
indirectly by explaining how the right can be violated, and in form
defining the right as a right not to have a certain result produced.
But if that mode of description is adopted, it must not be inferred
therefrom that the content of the right is an act. For instance, the
content of the right o' life is the state or condition of being alive:
but it is sometimes convenient to speak of it as a right not to be
killed. II.
There are five kinds of states of fact which the law protects,
giving rise to five classes of protected rights in ren. And these
are all the rights in rein that there are in the private law. They
are as follows:
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Protected states of fact. Rights in rem.
i. The condition of the party him- Rights of personal security.
self.
2. The condition of other persons. Rights in the persons of others.
3. The condition of material things. Normal property rights.
4. Certain relations of things. Abnormal property rights.
5. The party's pecuniary condition. The right of pecuniary con-
dition.
The first, second and fifth of the above mentioned rights are
protected rights only; in the third and fourth, rights of other kinds
are joined with the protected rights and must be defined in con-
nection with them.
I. Rights of personal security comprise the rights of life, bodily
security, mental -security, liberty and reputation. Under each of
these would fall to be described exactly what the state of fact is
which the law protects, or what interferences with the person violate
the right. The right of mental security is very limited in extent.
Generally the law does not seek to protect a person against mere
mental harm. How far it will do so is not yet quite settled.
II. Rights in the persons of other comprise the'rights of husbands
in their wives, parents in their children, masters in their servants,
etc. Rights which one of the parties to such a relation has in the
other, which are rights in ren, the duties corresponding to which
rest on outsiders, must be distinguished from his rights against the
other, which are rights in personain, whose corresponding duties.
rest on that other only.
III. A normal property right is a right in ren in a specific material
thing. Every right having those two characteristics falls into this
class of rights, however restricted its content, e. g., the right of every
person to use the public highway, which is in the nature of an
easement. Besides such rights there are many rights which are
classed as property for various purposes, which do not conform to
the above definition, and may be conveniently designated as abnormal
property.
Property rights are not exclusively protected rights; permissive
rights are joined with the protected ones, and there are also some-
facultative rights which should be classed with property rights, such
as powers of appointment and certain liens. The various species
of property rights are groups or combinations of a few elementary
rights, some kinds, such as ownership or fee simple, containing
many of these elements, others, as easement or the right of a
depositary, containing fewer. A full and systematic arrangement of
the subject would therefore fall under the following heads.
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A. The elementary rights of property. These are as follows.
(a) Permissive rights.
(i) The right of possession, jus possidendi; the holder of
this right is permitted to take or keep possession of the thing.




Taking a part of the thing, profit a prendre.
A person who has all of the above rights may deal with the
thing in any manner that he pleases; but a person may have some
of them without the others, and the right of use in any of its
sub-divisions may be general or confined to particular modes of
exercise as in easements. The right to transfer the thing is not
a separate right, but transferability is one attribute of all property
rights, and the physical delivery of the thing falls under use.
(b) Protected rights.
(i) The right of possession, jus possessionis. The content
of this right is the fact of possession; it is violated not only by
the possession of the thing by another, but by any physical
contact with the thing, as by a mere entry on land.
(2) The right in the physical condition of the thing. Any
change in that condition violates the right, except that incursions
upon premises of impalpable things, such as noise, smoke or
smells, do not always amount to violations of the right.
(c) Facultative rights. These will be no further noticed.
B. Ordinary property rights. These consist, as has been said,
of larger or smaller groups of the above mentioned elementary
rights. Under this head should be enumerated all the kinds of
property rights recognized by law, and the elements included in
each. Ownership includes all the permissive and protected rights
in their most general form. Lesser estates and rights, inferior
property rights, have more restricted contents. Thus a tenant
for years has the permissive and protected rights of possession,
the right of innocent use, and extensive rights in the condition
of the land, but not as extensive as those of tenant in fee; the
bolder of an easement has no right of possession, but has limited
rights of use and correspondingly limited rights in the condition
of the land, some interferences with which do not violate his right.
Facultative rights sometimes are attached to the minor groups of
permissive and protected rights, as in the case of a pledgee's
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power of sale, and sometimes stand as the sole constituents of
inferior property rights, as in the case of maritime liens.
C. Modifications of property rights. The various species of
property rights that would be described under the preceding head
B, may exist subject to modes or modifications, which should be
mentioned here. They may, for instance, be joint or several,
conditional or unconditional, in "possession" or in expectancy, etc.
D. Rights in certain special kinds of things, such as wild
animals, water, highways, dead bodies, etc.
E. Titles to property rights.
IV. Abnormtal property rights. Some of these are rights in
.personam. So far as they are rights in rem they include such
rights as franchises, patents and copyrights, which need not be
further discussed here. Like normal property rights they are
groups of permissive and protected rights, to which facultative
rights may be attached, as is the case with franchises.
V. The rights of pecuniary condition. This is a protected right
in the total value of a person's belongings. Subject to an excep-
tion presently to be noticed, any pecuniary loss to which a person
is subjected is a viblation of this right. This right is usually
confounded with property; but it differs from property in the
following respects:
(i) A person may have many separate rights of property in
many specific things; but only one general right of pecuniary
condition.
(2) Property relates to the possession and physical condition
of things; this right, so far as it concerns things at all, to their
value. A change in the physical condition of a thing which in-
creases its value may nevertheless violate the owner's property
right in it, and on the other hand, a thing may be reduced in
value without any violation of any property right in it.
(3) To deprive a person of a right of property does not
necessarily violate that right, but, every right being presumed to
have a pecuniary value, it does violate the holder's right of
pecuniary condition. Thus if A by fraud induces B to sell him
his chattel for less than it is worth, B's property right is not
violated. The physical condition of the thing is not impaired,
nor is B's possession interfered with so long as he retains the
right of possession. True, B ultimately parts with and A acquires
the possession, but at that time A and not B is the owner with
the right of possession. B has been unjustly deprived of his
right of property and has suffered a pecuniary loss. The right
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of his which has been violated is not his property right, but
his right of pecuniary condition. If B repudiates the contract,
and thus makes it void ab initio, the possession by A may be
considered a violation of B's property right; but not if B affirms
the contract and sues for the fraud.
(4) The rights of property and of pecuniary condition have
to a large extent different duties corresponding to them. Gener-
ally speaking the duties that correspond to the latter right are
duties of intention, and not even all the duties of that class,
while to rights of property correspond also many duties of reason-
ableness and peremptory duties. In other words, an act that
merely causes pecuniary loss without any interference with prop-
erty is not generally a breach of duty unless it is done fraudulently
or maliciously; but if an injury to property is in question,
a person may commit a breach of duty by mere negligence or
sometimes without even that.
Pecuniary loss may consist in the deprivation of some value
which a person already has, dainnumn cmergens, or in being prevented
from acquiring a gain which one would have acquired, hlcrum
cessans. The former is always a violation of this right; the latter,
according to the apparent weight of authority, is only so if the
gain is one which the person had a "special right" to acquire. In
connection with this right, two principles become important, (i) that
the violation of any legal right imports damage, i. e. the violation
of any other protected right is per se a violation of the right of
pecuniary condition also, and (2) the principle that every
right is presumed to have a pecuniary value, so that the de-
privation of a right imports pecuniary loss.
The duties that correspond to rights in rein do not fall into
any such natural and obvious arrangement as the rights do. The
acts which form their contents shade off into each other, so that
any grouping of them for the definition of distinct duties must be
to some extent arbitrary and merely conventional. Nor is it worth
while to attempt to define the different duties so that they shall be
mutually exclusive; perhaps that is not even possible. The over-
lapping of duties, so that the same act or omission will be a breach
of more than one duty, is a well recognized fact in the law, and in
a code or systematic arrangement of the law the case of such over-
lapping would have to be considered in its appropriate place. The
following arrangement of duties is submitted as a convenient one,
the statements of the duties being, the reader will understand, not
20r
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intended as full and exact definitions, but merely as somewhat
general descriptions, when more than a mere mention is attempted.
I. General peremptory duties.
(a) A person must not do any act the actual direct consequence
of which is to cause physical contact between two persons, two
things or a person and a thing, which contact amounts to a violation
of any such person's right of bodily security, a right of another
person in his bodily security or a right of possession in such thing.
The authorities differ as to whether such contact must be produced
intentionally or by negligence in order that the act may be a breach
of the duty. This is the duty generally broken in a trespass. It
corresponds to the rights above mentioned. The requirement of
"force" in a trespass means that the duty can be broken only by an
act, not by an omission, and that the act must result in a physical
contact. The definitional consequences of this duty are actual and
are such as impair the protected condition of fact, so that the cor-
responding right is necessarily violated at the same time with the
breach of duty.
(b) The duty not to commit an assault is very similar to the
above. Its breach is.also a trespass;.but it corresponds to rights
of mental security, actual physical contact not being necessary to an
assault.
(c) The duty not to remove the support of land or buildings
corresponds to the right of support, which is a sub-division of the
right in the physical condition of premises.
(d) A person must not take or keep possession of a thing in
violation of another person's right of possession therein. This is
not a duty actively to restore the thing to its rightful possessor,
but a purely negative duty. It is defined by actual consequences
which are also violative of its corresponding right, the right of
possession.
II. General duties of reasonableness. All these duties corre-
spond to rights of bodily security, rights of one person in the bodily
security of another and normal property rights.
(a) A person must not do any act which is unreasonably likely
to cause, i. e. is negligent because of its tendency to cause, a result
which would be a violation of any other person's right of bodily
security or his right in another's bodily security or of any normal
property right.
This is a very general negative duty resting upon all persons in all
circumstances. There is no such general duty of a positive nature.
Generally speaking, no person is bound to do acts for another's
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benefit. Duties to do acts always arise out of special circumstances.
(b) A person who has done or is doing an act which may cause
such a result as is above mentioned must take such precautions as
reasonableness requires to prevent that result.
If the original act is quite lawful, this is the only duty, and
a failure to perform it will be a mere non-feasance. But if the
original act was itself unreasonably dangerous. so as to be a breach
of the preceding duty, and these precautions are not taken, a result-
ing injury may be considered as due either to the original act or to
the subsequent omission, either to malfeasance or non-feasance.
When the precautions ought to be taken at tl-e same time as the
original act but are omitted, the original act being itself lawful,
the whole conduct. act and omission together, may usually be con-
sidered as a breach of duty in (a), and is then called misfeasance,
or doing a lawful act in an improper manner; or the omission may
be distinguished from the act and counted on as a breach oi the
duty in (b). Generally it makes no difference which view is taken.
What can be regarded as special cases of the two preceding
duties are:
(c) The duty not to deliver a dangerous thing to another person
in such circumstances as to expose him or others or their property
to an unreasonable risk; and
(d) The duty of a person who invites another to put himself
or his property into a situation of danger, to take due- precautions
against the danger.
III. Duties as to harmful things. There arc certain things of
such a dangerous or harmful nature that the law imposes special
duties as to them, defined directly by reference to'the state of the
thing itself, though corresponding to the rights of bodily security
and normal property. Here are found the chief cases where duties
are defined by reference to what have been above called intermediate
consequences.
Harmful things are of two kinds, dangerous things and nui-
sances. In general the difference between them is that the former
are useful and necessary things and the law does not seek to prevent
their existence entirely, but merely to guard against harm from
them; while nuisances are things that in general ought not to
exist at all, and the duties as to them are mostly directed to their
extirpation.
(a) Dangerous things. The possessor of a dangerous thing
must take reasonable precautions to prevent its doing harm. In
the case of fire, animals ferae naturae and, in England and a few of
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the United States, things of an actively dangerous nature, there
are certain more stringent duties, namely, actually to prevent the
harm, so that the duty is peremptory, and due care is not a defence
if injury happens.
(b) Nuisances. The word nuisance sometimes denotes a thing
and somethings a wrong committed by means of such a thing.
There is much confusion between those two meanings, and courts
often declare that a thing is not a nuisance when what is really
meant is, not that the thing has not of itself that nature, but that
some other element of a wrong is lacking. Here the word will be
used in the former sense only, so that the mere fact that a thing
exists and has itself the nature of a nuisance does not necessarily
imply any wrong. To make a wrong there must be a breach of
duty and other elements must be present, as will be hereafter
explained.
Aside from the criminal law, things which are nuisances are of
three kinds, namely:
(i) Nuisances by position; things which by merely being where
they are violate property rights;
(2) Active nuisances; things which emit or change the direction
of noxious things;
(3) Dangerous nuisances; things which, being what and where
they are, are unreasonably likely to injure persons or property.
Duties as to nuisances are partly peremptory and partly duties
of reasonableness. It is unnecessary to describe them in detail, but
they fall into the following groups:
(i) Duties not to do acts that will or may cause the existence
of nuisances;
(2) Duties to take precautions to prevent things from. becoming
nuisances;
(3) Duties to abate nuisances;
(4) In the exceptional cases where the law permits the existence
of nuisances, duties to prevent them or to take precautions to prevent
them from doing harm.
IV. Duties of intention.
(a) General duties. There are certain duties of a general nature
not to do acts with an intention to produce certain injurious results.
A full description of them, one by one, or even a brief description
or enumeration of them, would occupy too much space to be gone
into here, since to make it intelligible it would be necessary to go
into an explanation of the different kinds of intention and of
sundry other states of mind that are often legally equivalent to
T.EGAL DUTIES AND RIGHTS.
intention, and a discussion of several conflicting theories as to
the nature of malice. Some of these duties correspond only to
certain rights of security and normal property, others to all rights
of security, rights in the persons of others, and both normal and
abnormal property, while others still include in their correspondence
the right of pecuniary condition. For example, any intentional
interference with a thing which belongs to another is wrongful,
though the actor believes the thing to be his own or a res indlius,
but hiring another man's servant, whereby he is induced to quit his
master's service in violation of the latter's right, is not a wrong
unless the hirer knows of the existing service. Certain malicious
acts are actionable if they cause pecuniary loss, though no other
right is violated.
(b) Certain more special duties. Malicious prosecution, abuse
of process, and fraudulent misrepresentation are breaches of duties
which correspond to all rights except perhaps reputation; mere pe-
cuniary damage is a sufficient violation of right in these cases, but is
not necessary. An action has been maintained against a man
who persuaded a woman to have sexual intercourse with him by
personating her husband, where the right violated was her security.
Duties not to publish slanders and libels, to which the rules as to
privileged communications formulate exceptions, correspond to
rights of reputation.
V. The duties of tenants of land and bailees to their landlords and
bailors, and of bailees of services, so far as these are not contractual
but arise by "law" or "the custom of the realm," appear to the
present writer to correspond partly to rights in ren, property or
pecuniary condition, and partly to rights in personam; but it would
doubtless be most convenient to treat of them all in one place.
They generally overlap with contract duties, which undoubtedly
correspond to rights in personam, and are often modified by
contract.
VI. Duties of public officers, so far as these are owed to in-
dividuals.
VII. Statutory duties. Of these nothing can be said in general.
The question that most often arises is whether the duty is or is
not intended to correspond to private rights and be owed to private
persons at all.
Most of the above mentioned duties are subject to certain
exceptions, which are special to them; and there are also a number
of more general exceptions which exist to all or nearly all of them.
The chief of these latter fall under the five heads of (i) the exercise
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of public or private authority, (2) defence and protection of one's
own person or property or that of others, (3) license or the volun-
tary taking of risk, (4) receiving possession of a thing in good
faith from a person who has possession, and (5) special suscepti-
bility in the person or thing injured..
Rights in personam and their corresponding duties fall into two
great divisions, namely (I) obligations and (II) equities. The
word obligation is here used in its Roman sense, to denote the
legal relations, juris zinculum, between the parties, consisting of a
right on one side and a duty on the other. Many equitable rights
and duties, indeed the majority of them, are of the nature of
obligations, but are excluded in the following enumeration.
Generally the states of fact that form the contents of rights
in personam are of the same nature as in rights in rein, though
often more restricted in their scope. Thus in a debt, the state of
fact that is protected for the creditor is like a part of his right of
pecuniary condition; and in the case of a contract for the sale of
land the possession of the land, which is also the content of a
right in rem, is a part at least of the content of the protected contract
right, though not thq whole of it.
I. Obligations, according to their modes of acquisition, are
classified as follows:
(a) Obligations created by the direct act of the state, as by
statute or the judgment or decree of a court.
(b) Obligations created by the agreement of the parties. The
most important of these are contract obligations, where the agree-
ment takes the form of a promise; but a debt can be created by a
deed of grant. Many equitable obligations are also created by
agreements, such as gifts in trust and declarations of trdst, which
are not properly contracts but rather in the nature of gifts or convey-
ances. Of this class of obligations the content, the state of fact to
be protected, is determined by the agreement.
Implied contracts, so far as these rest upon presumptions that
the parties intended to contract, belong here. But there is a class
of obligations which in our law are said to arise from implied
contract, when no such presumption can properly be made. These
were classed with contract obligations merely to bring them within
the scope of the action of assumpsit; but the supposed contract is
a pure fiction. Behind the fictitious contract there is always some
actual act or event out of which the obligation really arises, which
is capable of being described. Indeed it is already recognized in
our law as giving rise to an obligation, namely, a debt. Then
the fictitious contract is posited in the form of a promise to pay
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that debt. "Bieing indebted, he undertook and promised to pay,"
is the formula of the old declarations. The debt is an actual one,
and the facts from which it has arisen are actual facts. An action
of debt would lie without the implied promise, but formerly would
have been obnoxious to the defendant's wager of law, to avoid
which the fiction of a promise was resorted to and assumpsit substi-
tuted for debt. Now that forms of action and wager of law are
abolished, there seems no good reason to retain the fiction. It
would be better to describe these obligations as non-contractual ones,
classifying them according to the actual facts out of which they
spring.
(c) Obligations arising from the acceptance of services. These
are obligations to pay at once, technically "on demand," the reason-
able value of the service. The service must as a general rule be
rendered with the expectation of payment, not as a mere kindness.
(i) When the service is accepted voluntarily the obligation
generally arises. In this case there is usually also an actual contract
to pay, express or implied, and an action may be brought either on
the contract or on the non-contractual obligation, the form of action
in the former case being special assumpsit and in the latter debt
or indebitatus assumpsit.
(2) When the acceptance is not voluntary our law as a general
rule creates no obligation, but in a few cases it does. Obligations
arising in this way have been aptly turned by Mr. Holland meri-
torious obligations. The obligation to pay for salvage services
is an example of them, and in the Roman law the rights of a
negotiorum gestor.
(d) Closely connected with the foregoing are obligations to make
compensation for benefits derived from the use of another's prop-
erty. Thus if A's logs are carried and left on B's land by a freshet,
it has becn held that A may enter and take them, but must com-
pensate B for any injury done to the land.
(e) Obligations to restore, arising from holding something of
another's. If the duties of tenants and bailees to restore the land or
chattel to its owner are really obligations, they belong here. There
are also many obligations of this sort which are equitable. Besides
the above, the most important obligations of this class are those
which arise from getting possession of a sum of money belonging
to another, which were the foundation for the old action for money
had and received, and coincide with some of the cbligations quasi
ex contractu, which in the civil law are said to arise from unjust
enrichment.
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(f) Obligations arising under penal statutes should also be
mentioned.
It appears to the present writer that the class of obligations
called in the Roman law obligations ex delicto is not recognized
in our law; that our law does not regard a tort as giving rise to an
obligation or an action of tort as in the nature of a proceeding for the
specific enforcement of an obligation to make compensation.
II. Equities.
The essential nature of an equitable right is that it is a claim in
favor of one person upon a right held by another. Regularly the
holder of a right may exercise, enforce or dispose of it in any
way that its nature admits of entirely at his own pleasure. But
if he holds it subject to an equity, another person has a claim which
he must not disregard. An equity is not a right in the thing
which forms the subject of the other right, but is a claim upon the
right. If A is the legal tenant in fee and B has an easement in
the land, B's right is a right directly in the land; the land, the
material thing, is its subject, and the right exists against all the
world. But if A holds in trust for B, B has no right in the land,
A can sell and convey to a bona fide purchaser-for value free of
the equity. and B can have no action even in equity against a stranger
who intrudes on the land. B's right is a claim on A's estate, on
his right, not on the material land; it is a right in personam against
A only, or in some cases against A's successor in title. At the
same time it is more than a mere personal claim against A; it is a
claim on that specific right held by A.
This conception of an equity as a claim on a right, controlling
the holder of the right in his disposition of it, if not actually
peculiar to our law, has been extended and developed in ofir law to
a much greater extent than in the civil law, and has been found
eminently convenient and beneficial. It should be given full recog-
nition in a code or arrangement, although some rules which are
now only equitable might no doubt with advantage be adopted
also at law and thus made general and taken out of the special
department of equity.
As to nomenclature; at present the holder of the right subject
to the claim is usually called the trustee, the claimant the cestui
que trust, the claim itself a trust, while for the right held subject
to the trust there is no recognized name, unless it happens to be a
property right and can be designated as the trust property. The
objection to this nomenclature is that the word trust is also used
in a narrower sense, to denote a single class of equities which have
certain important peculiarities of their own. It is not desirable to
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use the word, and its connected terms, trustee and cestni qne trtst
in both senses; confusion has often arisen from doing so; and it is
submitted that the narrower significations are the more appropriate.
In the wider sense, applicable to all equities, the following names
are suggested: the right held subject to an equity should be called
the basis-right; the person in whom that right is vested, the basis-
right-holder; the party in whose favor the claim exists, the equitable
claimant; and his claim itself, the equity.
The equity itself is either an obligation, a protected right having
a corresponding equitable duty which rests on the basis-right-holder,
or is a lien, a mere facultative right exercisable by the aid of a court,
but with no corresponding duty. Even if the lien is given, as it
usually is, to secure the performance of some duty, the duty does
not correspond to the lien; it may be a legal and not an equitable
duty, and could equally well exist were there no lien.
Wrongs, in the sense of civil injuries, omitting crimes to which
the following analysis does not wholly apply, have the following
elements.
i. An act or omission which is a breach of some duty that
corresponds to a private right and is- owed to a private person.
Without a breach of duty, any damage that happens to a person
from the conduct of others is danunit absque injitria.
2. A violation of right. A negligent act, for instance, cr a
mere malicious attempt to do an injury, though it may be a brea,-h
of duty or een a crime, is not an actionable wrong unless a violation
of right follows.
3. Correspondence between the duty broken and the right
violated. Without this correspondence a breach of duty followed
by a violation of right is still not a wrong. The reason whv a
life insurance company can not have an action against a parseri
who negligently kills one of its policy holders is that the duty nct
to act negligently does not correspond to the righl of pecuniary
condition, which is the only right of the compan; that is violatcd.
On the same principle it was held that vhere :'*ir plaintiff lia.1
contracted with a township to support a pauper ancd furnish hiri
with necessaries f,,r a year for a fixed sum, he c,.'.:l not have anj
action against the defendant, who beat and wounded the I)at:.. ",
whereby the plaintiff was put to expense for in.,lical attelda..
and nursing for the pauper. The duty not to beat an,ther ,:,;r-
responds to rights of personal security; but the pla'.'tiff had no
right in the pauper's security, only his right of pecuniary conditicn
was violated.
Want of correspondence between the duty and the right is
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usually confounded with remoteness of the injurious consequences,
but it is not the same thing.
4. The violation of right must be the actual consequence of the
act or omission which constitutes the breach of duty. This is
obvious. The rule that a fraudulent misrepresentation is not action-
able unless it is actually believed and acted upon is an application
of this principle, and must not be confounded with the rule that
in order to make a false representation fraudulent it must be
intended to be believed and acted on.
5. The violation of the right must not only be the actual con-
sequence of the conduct, but in the legal sense its proximate con-
sequence. The law as to proximateness of consequences is in a
very confused and unsatisfactory state.
The foregoing are the elements of the wrong itself. If any
one of them is missing there is no legal wrong and no cause of
action, however blameworthy the conduct of one party or however
great the damage to the other. But when a complete wrong has
once been made out, the recovery of damages is not necessarily
confined to compensation for the wrong itself. Further injurious
consequences, "consequential damage," resulting from the wrong
may often be recovered for, if properly alleged. To these injurious
consequences extraneous to the wrong the rules apply that they
must be the actual and proximate consequences of the wrongful
act or omission. But they need not be violations of the right to
which the duty corresponded. For instance, although the duty
not to commit an assault and battery does not correspond to the
right of pecuniary condition, yet if bodily injury is proved amount-
ing to a violation of the right of security to which that duty does
correspond, then resulting pecuniary loss forms a proper basis
for additional damages. The elements of a ground of recovery are
shown in the following diagram:
The Wrong.
A-s 3rd group of
The act or 1st group of 2nd group of consequences.
omission. consequences. consequences. Additional
Definitional Consequences consequences,
consequences constituting a not violative
of the duty, violation of the of the right;
when actual. corresponding consequential
• right. damage.
The Breach of Duty.
The Entire Basis of the Recovery.
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The first group of consequences will be absent if the duty is not
defined by actual consequences, and if present may vholly or partly
coincide with the second group. The third group may or may
not be present.
The following is an outline of an arrangement of the substantive
private law of normal persons based on the foregoing analysis.
Part First. Definitions and General Principles.
This part should contain definitions of all legal conceptions that
are to be used as praccognoscenda in defining duties, rights and
wrongs and certain general rules relating to them; e. g. definitions
of such terms as person, thing, fact, act, intention, negligence, pos-
session, juristic act, agreement, contract, duty, right, wrong, etc.,
and such general rules as those relating to presumptions of death,
kinship, presumptions as to possession, the computation of time, etc.
The word contract has two meanings. It denotes sometimes the
juristic act from which an obligation results, as when we say that
a contract requires a consideration or is voidable for fraud; and
sometimes it denotes the obligation itself, as when we speak of the
extinction or assignment of a contract. All that relates to the first
of these, to the nature and validity of the juristic act, falls into this
first part; the treatment of the resulting obligation would belong
to the next.
Part Second. Rights and Duties.
(i) Rights in rem.
(a) The rights.
(b) The duties and exceptions to them.
(2) Rights in personam.
(a) Obligations.
(b) Equities.
Under obligations would fall to be discussed how obligations
arise, and the transfer, modification, extinction and performance of
them. Some rules on these subjects apply to obligations generally,
and some to particular classes of obligations only.
(3) The overlapping of duties.
Part Third. Wrongs.
The greater part of what is now usually discussed under the
head of torts concerns the duties broken and the rights violated.
That would not fall here. This part of the law would in fact be
rather short, being confined mostly to the subject of the necessary
conjunction of the various elements to make a wrong, and rules as
to the locality of wrongs, where a wrong must be deemed to have
been committed when its different elements exist in different places,
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and the identity of wrongs, whether a given group of elements
amounts to one wrong or more than one.
Part Third. Remedies.
The points to be considered here are whether the law gives any
remedy for a wrong, as it sometimes does not, e. g. in cases where
the complainant has been guilty of contributory wrong, or when
the wrong is a common injury to all members of the community, as
in the case of some public nuisances; and what is the proper remedy
for such kind of wrong, and the election between remedies if there
is more than one. But the procedure by which the proper remedy
is to be oltained falls under the adjective law.
Henry T. Terry.
